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Abstract: Recent WHO guidelines for antiretroviral therapy recommend switching to less toxic, but more expensive medicines 
for first-line and second-line ART, raising questions about the financial sustainability of many AIDS treatment programmes. At 
the same time, many key generic producing countries such as India now grant pharmaceutical product patents so competition 
between multiple manufacturers will not be able to play the role it has in bringing down the price of newer drugs. 
Overcoming these patent barriers will require a range of solutions, such as restricting patentability criteria, or compulsory 
licensing. One additional systematic solution is provided by the patent pool, a collective solution to the management of patent 
rights, initially presented by Médecins Sans Frontières to the French Foreign Ministry and subsequently the UNITAID Executive 
Board in 2006. 
A patent pool must not be implemented at any costs, but answer medical needs, be based on economic realities and meet the 
access needs of the developing world, including middle-income countries. 
INTRODUCTION 
  There have been striking advances in the past years in 
providing antiretroviral therapy (ART) in developing 
countries with an estimated three million people on treatment 
today [1]. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) provides 
antiretroviral (ARV) treatment to over 140,000 people in 
over 30 countries. 10,000 of them are children under five 
years of age. 
  Two key factors combine to make this possible. Firstly, 
the price of the first-line drug combination that is most 
commonly used in the developing world dropped, from 
US$12,000 per patient per year in 2000 to less than US$ 90, 
thanks to fierce competition among  multiple generic  manu-
facturers in key producing countries like India [2]. Second, the 
creation by generic producers of a triple fixed-dose combinations 
(FDCs) of stavudine/lamivudine/nevirapine, made it possible for 
a person on ART to only have to take two pills a day. 
Simplifcation and reduced pill burden have been important 
factors to ensure treatment adherence and facilitate scale up 
in resource poor settings. 
HISTORY REPEATING? THE NEW ACCESS CRISIS 
  But the access to medicines crisis is far from resolved. 
Not only do many still not receive access to treatment but 
also the per-patient cost of antiretroviral drugs is set to rise 
again. From 2005, a number of developments in the worlds 
of AIDS treatment and intellectual property has raised once 
more the spectre of price barriers and availability issues. 
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  Since 2006, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
recommendations includes tenofovir disoproxil fumarate 
(TDF) based first line regimens [3]. The significant side 
effects associated with stavudine (d4T) mean that it is 
preferable to move towards to less toxic regimens containing 
zidovudine (AZT) or TDF. In an MSF AIDS projects in 
Rwanda, almost one in every six people on stavudine had to 
change their regimen due to toxicity. Yet implementation has 
been slow as the price of the TDF-based regimens can be 
between four and as much as eleven times higher than the 
older, d4T-based regimens. 
  People on ART also require  continuous  access to 
different  and  newer  medicine  combinations as their 
treatment progresses. As  some  people  in developing 
countries  have  now been on treatment  for nine  years  or 
more, levels of resistance are increasing. More and more 
patients will thus need to switch regimens and have access to 
newer medicines,  and  will continue to do so for the  duration 
of their lives. In MSF's longest-running AIDS project in 
Khayelitsha, South Africa,  approximately 16 per cent of 
patients on  treatment for five years needed to be switched 
to  a  second-line drug combination (MSF internal data, 
Khayelitsha Project, Cape Town, South Africa van Cutsem). 
  But the price of these second-line medicines is 
dramatically higher than the cost of the older ones. In some 
countries switching a patient from a first- to second-line 
regimen increases the cost of treatment between nine 
and seventeen-fold [2]. 
  Finally, the intellectual property environment is 
changing. Before 2005, production  by  multiple 
manufacturers, the catalyst for the 99 per cent price drop 
for older antiretrovirals, was  possible due to the lack of 
patents in manufacturing countries like India. This also allowed   
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the production  of fixed-dose combination pills – crucial to the 
simplification of treatment that  has fostered global  scale-up – 
because patents on the individual compounds did not stand 
in the way of combining the drugs. But since India began 
granting pharmaceutical product patents in 2005, this 
situation is changing [4]. 
  Now the patenting of newer medicines in India means 
that generic manufacturers are unlikely to be able to enter the 
market and create the kind of competition that leads to the 
dramatic price reductions seen in the past. India’s new patent 
law contains valuable public health safeguards that limit 
patentability of drugs and allow civil society organisations to 
oppose patents before or after they are granted. Nevertheless, 
many of the newer ARVs will be patentable in India, and 
several, such as raltegravir, maraviroc or etravirine already 
are. 
  Against this changing situation, MSF and other treatment 
providers are once again faced with a situation where drugs 
could be priced outside the reach of patients. 
LOOKING FOR SOLUTIONS 
  Overcoming these patent barriers will require a range of 
different solutions. 
  The restricting of patentability criteria – such as section 
3d and its public health safeguards contained in India’s 2005 
Patents Act - is an essential tool to keep the door open for 
generic competition. 
  Once drugs are patented, however, the only way to 
overcome monopoly control is through some kind of 
licensing. This means that generic manufacturers will no 
longer be able to produce affordable versions of drugs unless 
the company agrees to voluntary licences with generic 
manufacturers, or a government decides to overcome a 
patent barrier with a legal mechanism in patent law called a 
‘compulsory licence’ (CL). 
  CLs have proven to bring down the price of drugs 
dramatically – the CL issued by Thailand for 
lopinavir/ritonavir (LPV/r) in January 2007 is perhaps the 
most clear illustration of this. Over the course of the past two 
years, the priced for LPV/r in middle-income countries has 
decreased by as much as 79 per cent from US$2,200 per 
patient per year to as low as US$470 in countries included in 
the Clinton Foundation consortium. 
  Although issuing a CL is entirely within World Trade 
Organization rules, countries that take the step typically face 
immense direct and indirect retaliatory measures and 
pressure from developing country governments and the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
  Yet the fight for greater access to essential drugs cannot 
sustainably be fought on a drug-by-drug, country-by-country 
basis alone. We still lack a systematic solution to the 
problem of access to medicines for developing countries. 
  In 2006, a new drug purchasing facility for HIV, TB and 
malaria, UNITAID was being developed under French 
impetus. Given the new body’s focus on providing 
innovative solutions, MSF identified this move as a potential 
opportunity to promote new ways to overcome access and 
innovation barriers for HIV medicines. 
A COLLECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE MANAGE-
MENT OF PATENT RIGHTS 
  In June 2006, MSF submitted two papers to the French 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNITAID on intellectual 
property rights and medicines procurement (Paper one: 
Government use for non-commercial purposes, non-
recognition and non- enforceability of pharmaceutical patent 
and data protection. Paper two: Patent Pools). 
  The first recommended that UNITAID require the 
purchase of ARVs from the lowest-cost quality-assured 
providers and actively encourage its beneficiaries to use the 
provisions of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public 
Health to allow for the purchase of generic ARVs when a 
patent exists. 
  The second paper, prepared with input from Essential 
Inventions, now part of Knowledge Ecology International, 
outlined the case for UNITAID to establish a patent pool for 
HIV medicines (Declaration of Interest: the writer was at that 
time CEO of Essential Inventions and worked with MSF on 
the preparation of the two papers). Such a move would 
complement existing efforts to lower drug prices and offer a 
more systematic approach to the collective management of 
patent rights. 
  In a patent pool, the holders of individual drug patents 
(such as companies, universities or research institutes) put 
their patents into a ‘pool.’ The administrators of the pool 
then license the use of the patents to any interested producers 
for production or further development, on payment of a 
royalty, which goes back to the original patent holder. 
  There were a number of potential models for such a pool. 
One of the most developed at the time was the proposal for a 
pool for essential medicines presented to WHO, UNAIDS 
and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria by Essential Inventions on 17 January 2005 [5], 
which in turn drew on the US experience of the 
Manufacturers Aircraft Association pool, formed in 1917 in 
response to a crisis: the US decision to enter World War I. 
  The proposal for the creation of a UNITAID Medicines 
patent pool was spurred by a similar crisis: the looming crisis 
in innovation of and access to HIV medicines in developing 
countries. 
  The initial MSF proposal suggested that the pool focus 
on the patents required for the development and production 
of generic fixed-dose combinations of TDF/3TC/EFV or 
NVP both for adult use and for use in children, and the 
development of generic versions of heat-stable LPV/r. 
  The pool needed to recognise the economic realities of 
generic production and the geographic scope of the licences 
would have to be sufficiently large to ensure generic 
manufacturers could benefit from economies of scale and be 
able to export. MSF also recommended that the initial aim of 
the pool should be to seek voluntary contribution of patents 
by patent holders, but that compulsory licensing should 
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  The pool model was seen as having the potential to 
accelerate access to more affordable medicines, as the 
development of generic medicines could start well before a 
20-year patent term expires. A pool would also help to 
stimulate the development of new FDCs and paediatric 
formulations. By reducing both risks and transaction costs, it 
also offers an attractive alternative to the current system for 
both patent-holders and medicines producers. All of these 
factors combined can translate into important benefits for 
patients through wider access to affordable, appropriate 
medicines. 
THE ROAD TO THE POOL 
  The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that 
MSF present at the UNITAID Board meeting in September 
2006. The Board felt it was worth further exploration and an 
independent legal review of the proposal was commissioned. 
Its conclusion that the concept was in principle legally viable 
was reported back to the Board in July 2007. 
  The UNITAID board recognised that the key issues 
would in practice be economic and political – in other words, 
the willingness of patent holders to contribute to the pool, 
and defining the nature of the incentives that would be 
required for them to do so. Very quickly, the discussions 
focused on two key areas: 
-  the nature of the pool - what medicines should be 
included; and 
-  the scope of the pool. Here, there were two aspects: 
firstly, determining which countries can manufacture 
medicines under licence to the pool and secondly, 
determining in which countries such medicines could 
be sold. The question arose as to whether the pool 
should be restricted to low income countries only, as 
the inclusion of middle-income countries was and 
remains the most contentious issue. On the one hand, 
these are countries whose actual or potential 
manufacturing capability (in addition to the large 
number of potential beneficiaries of more affordable 
medicines) makes it essential for them to be included 
in the pool. On the other, these are precisely the 
countries where originator companies in the medium-
term foresee strong market growth and therefore there 
was a concern that they may be unwilling to put 
patents in the pool without strong incentives to do so. 
  In December 2007, the UNITAID Board agreed to 
continue to explore the option of establishing a pool, 
requesting the Secretariat to establish and lead a 
multidisciplinary team of experts to propose options for the 
key characteristics of the pool, including its nature and 
scope. MSF was invited to be part of this Expert Group. 
There were a number of meetings of the Group in 2008, with 
interim reports to the UNITAID Board. 
  In July 2008, the UNITAID Board was asked to endorse 
the principle of the establishment of a patent pool, based on a 
report drawn up by the UNITAID Secretariat, and drawing 
on discussions with the Expert Group [6]. The Secretariat 
recommended that: 
  the UNITAID patent pool be set up as a voluntary 
mechanism. 
  the coverage of the patent pool should not be limited 
to patents relating to FDCs of ARVs for adult and 
paediatric use, but rather should provide the 
opportunity for the patent owners to voluntarily 
licence any patents useful in providing ARV therapy 
to address low- and middle-income country needs. 
  at least in its initial phases, the scope of the patent 
pool should include all middle- and lower-income 
countries (i.e. those countries that are not defined as 
high-income by the World Bank), subject to the 
ability of patent owners to make exceptions for all 
countries where they do not want the licence to apply. 
On the basis that this provided maximum flexibility 
without unnecessarily narrowing the scope of the 
coverage. 
  The UNITAID Board gave approval in principle and 
mandated the establishment of a task force to design the 
structure for the medicines patent pool and develop the tools 
necessary to implement it, and to report back to the Board 
for final approval. 
CONCLUSION: A POOL, BUT NOT AT ANY COST 
  The UNITAID Board, made up of developing and 
developed country representatives, had shown great vision in 
agreeing to the patent pool in principle, publicly 
acknowledging that new solutions are needed to ensure that 
access targets can be met. 
  However this decision is rather like receiving the 
planning permission to build a house: the pool must now be 
built. We are at the beginning of the process, not the end. 
  Because the pool is voluntary, its success will depend on 
patent owners – be they pharmaceutical companies, 
universities or researchers – putting their patent into a pool, 
and for generic companies to access the pool, in return for 
payment of a fair royalty rate. 
  There may be difficult discussions ahead, which will 
require all involved to keep a focus on the issue at stake: the 
entirely predictable problem in the short-term of rising drug 
prices, putting access to medicines at risk. There is an 
opportunity to act now, and avoid confrontation and 
litigation which costs time and lives. 
  A pool should not be implemented at any cost, however. 
It must be based on three criteria: 
1)  Medical needs: these go beyond just first- and 
second-line drugs. Newer drugs, such as raltegravir, 
etravirine and darunavir, are potent, safe and are now 
well known and part of treatment recommendations in 
developed countries. Other new medicines, still in 
development, such as rilpivirine, have the potential to 
be co-formulated, low dose and cheap and can be 
used either in treatment-experienced or naïve patients. 
Also, new booster medicines such as GS-9350 and 
SPI-452 are needed to avoid the current one company 
monopoly on ritonavir. The wide time gap in 
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should be avoided. These medicines can save lives of 
patients who have been exposed to all existing WHO 
treatment lines, but can also be the cornerstone of 
innovative first line regimens. Concerning paediatric 
HIV medicines, we would like to have all medicines 
already tested in children included, namely, 
darunavir, atazanavir, fosamprenavir and paediatric 
heat-stable ritonavir and  the newer ARV's tested and 
developed for paediatric indications for all ages [7]. 
2)  Economic realities: licences must include all 
developing countries. The UNITAID proposal is for 
all developing countries, whether least-developed or 
middle-income. This is an important point. It is 
primarily middle-income countries that have generic 
production capacities. In addition, if the licences are 
made applicable to a large market in the developing 
world, production would be economically attractive 
to multiple producers. Competition between multiple 
producers would bring down drug prices which in 
turn would help to reach greater numbers of patients. 
3)  Meet the access needs in all developing countries. 
All developing countries should be able to benefit 
from the medicines produced under licence from the 
UNITAID pool. Within middle-income countries, 
wide differences in income levels persist, and there 
are poor populations that need access to more 
affordable medicines too, as the recent example of 
Thailand has shown. 
  If the UNITAID patent pool succeeds, the effects could 
be very significant, both in the area of access to medicine, 
namely bringing prices down, and in the area of developing 
desperately needed drug combinations and paediatric 
formulations. But success will depend on everybody working 
together to build the pool. 
  That is the challenge for all of us. 
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